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Good and Bad Institutions: Is the Debate Over? 
Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence from the Textile Industry
* 
 
Using firm-level data from nine developing countries we demonstrate that (a) certain 
institutions like restrictive labour market regulations that are considered to be bad for 
economic growth might be beneficial for production efficiency, whereas (b) good business 
environment which is considered to be beneficial for economic growth might have an adverse 
impact on production efficiency. We argue that our results suggest that the debate about the 
implications of institutional quality is far from being over, and classification of institutions into 
“good” and “bad” might be premature. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now stylised that institutions have significant impact on economic performance. 
North (1991) argues that institutions – formal and informal – are created to reduce 
uncertainty about exchanges; property right is a textbook example (Demsetz, 1967; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). As such, institutions can refer to both the governance 
structures that define the rules of the game and to the rules of the game themselves 
(Coase, 1937; Shubik, 1975; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Efficient institutions clearly 
define the boundaries within which economic agents can act, thereby enabling 
transactions at low cost. The logical outcome of efficient institutions, therefore, is 
better economic performance.  
  Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of papers that have 
examined various aspects of the relationship between institutional quality and 
economic performance. Researchers have demonstrated that governance 
characteristics that define the rules of the game have an impact on economy-wide 
development performance (Campos and Nugent, 1999), such that institutional quality, 
as opposed to factors such as geography and trade, is arguably the key determinant of 
economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004). In particular, researchers 
have argued that the nature of property rights (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005), legal institutions (Levine, 1998), and labour market institutions 
(Nickell and Layard, 1999; Besley and Burgess, 2004) affect a country’s (or region’s) 
economic growth, investment and production efficiency.  
  However, the debate about the nature of institutions that improve economic 
performance is far from being over. For example, there is as yet no consensus about 
whether democracy or autocracy is better at generating economic growth. While 
property rights can be credibly guaranteed in a democracy (Olson, 1991), with the 3 
 
attendant (positive) impact on economic growth, lobbying by groups with different 
interests, that is an integral part of a democracy, results in inefficient use of resources 
(Becker, 1983). To complicate matters further, it has been argued that political 
institutions may not influence economic growth significantly after all; growth instead 
is an outcome of economic policies pursued by government (Glaeser et al., 2004). 
Similarly, it has alternately been argued that corruption can be both transaction 
facilitating and therefore growth enhancing (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985), and 
transaction inhibiting and hence growth reducing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
  More importantly, the focus of the literature has largely been macro 
performance of economies, as manifested in economic growth and its correlates like 
investment.  Other than in the literature on corporate governance,
1
In this paper, we contribute to this nascent literature by examining the 
institutional quality-firm performance relationship, using a unique cross-country 
micro data set to examine the impact of institutions on firm level efficiency. We 
choose efficiency (with which inputs are converted into output) as our measure of 
firm performance because it is consistent with a key developmental concern, namely, 
  the impact of 
institutions on firm performance  is largely ignored. The little evidence that is 
available is inconclusive. Using firm-level data on mostly Asian developing 
economies, Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengiste (2005) find that cross-country 
differences do affect firm performance, even after controlling for country fixed 
effects. By contrast, Commander and Svejnar (2007) find that the impact of 
institutional quality (or “business environment”) on firm performance is limited in the 
post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
                                                 
1 In the corporate governance literature, researchers have argued, for example, that a weak 
legal system and, correspondingly, weak enforceability of contracts lead to creation of family 
firms and concentration of equity in the hands of these families and this, in turn, has 
implications for the quality of corporate governance and firm performance.  4 
 
the generation of economic growth using limited resources. We focus on firms in the 
textile industry in nine developing countries, textile being an industry in which 
developing countries have comparative advantage and a strong presence in the global 
market.
2
The neo-classical production theory implicitly assumes that all production activities 
take place on the frontier of a feasible production set (subject to random errors). The 
 Further, as we shall discuss later, we concentrate on institutions such as 
economic freedom that define the rules of the game and thereby influence the ease 
with which transactions can take place in product and factor markets. 
Our results indicate that institutions do indeed influence firm-level efficiency, 
after controlling for factors such as size and ownership, but not in the way that is 
suggested by conventional wisdom. Labour market institutions that provide greater 
social security benefits and employment rights reduce  inefficiency in production. 
Better business environments increase such inefficiencies. Our results suggest that 
there is greater scope for research on the relationship between institutional quality and 
firm performance; the debate about this relationship is far from being over. While 
restrictive or low quality institutions may adversely affect outcomes such as firm 
entry rates, they might be beneficial for productive efficiencies of incumbent firms, 
such that blanket classification of institutions as “good” or “bad” might be too 
simplistic.  
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the 
empirical strategy. In Section 3, we discuss the data and specification. The results are 
discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling firm efficiency 
                                                 
2  At the middle of the decade, even before the end of the quotas embedded in the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement, developing countries accounted for half the world’s textile exports and three-quarters of 
the clothing exports (UNCTAD, 2005).   5 
 
frontier itself is defined as of the maximum possible output that is technically 
attainable for the given inputs (output-oriented measure), or as the observed output 
level that can be produced using least amounts of inputs (input-oriented measure). 
The production efficiency literature, however, relaxes the assumption, and considers 
the possibility that production activities might take place inside the frontier due to 
technical inefficiency. Technical inefficiency can be output-oriented if actual output 
produced is less than the frontier output for a given amount of input (subject to 
random errors). Alternatively, it can be input oriented if the amount of inputs actually 
used is more than the minimum required to produce a given level of output. These are 
two ways of examining inefficiency. Graphically, the inefficient production plans are 
located below the production frontier.  
 
<INSERT Figure 1 about here> 
 
In Figure 1, f(x) is the production frontier, and point A is an inefficient 
production point. There are two ways to see why the production plan in A is 
inefficient. The first way is to see that at the current level of input usage (x = ON) 
maximum possible output that can be produced is OA, given the technology. Thus, 
the distance AB shows the amount of output that is lost due to technical inefficiency, 
and it forms the basis from which the output-oriented (OO) technical inefficiency is 
measured. The other way to see why point A is inefficient is to recognize that the 
same level of output can be produced using less inputs, which means that the 
production point can move to the frontier by reducing inputs. Thus, the distance AC 
measures the amount by which the input can be reduced without reducing output. 6 
 
Since this move is associated with reducing inputs, the horizontal distance AC forms 
the basis to measure input-oriented (IO) technical inefficiency. 
Mathematically, we can write the production relationship as 
) ( u v X y − + = β                   (1) 
where X is a vector of factor inputs, v is the iid error term which follows a normal 
distribution with a zero mean and positive variance, and u  is the non-negative 
inefficiency term that has a half normal distribution (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Inefficiency (at the firm-level, for example) itself can then be modelled as  
δ Z u =                     (2) 
where Z  is a vector of explanatory variables (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The two 
equations are estimated simultaneously using the maximum likelihood method, and 
the resultant estimates are unbiased and efficient.  
  In our paper, we adopt the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach to modelling 
output and efficiency. We model output as a translog function of  material inputs, 
labour and capital, and simultaneously model firm level inefficiency as a function of 
firm level characteristics like size and a number of institutional variables that 
characterise the environment in which the firms operate. We discuss the specific 
measures of variables in the next section. 
 
3. Specification and data 
We opt for a translog production function: 
 
      (3) 7 
 
when y is sales, m is cost of materials used for production, l is the cost of labour, k is 
capital stock, u is the half-normally distributed inefficiency term, and v is the iid error 
term.  
  Next, we identify variables that explain firm-level inefficiency generated from 
equation (3). Our focus on a single globalised industry eliminates the need to control 
for the extent of competition which usually affects firm performance. We, therefore, 
use the following variables to explain inter-firm differences in inefficiency: 
  Size: We control for firm size which has implications for economies of scale, 
and hence efficiency. Our measure of firm size is a categorical variable that ranks 
firms on a 5-point scale. The categories themselves are based on the number of 
employees.  
Ownership: There is a large literature on the impact of ownership on firm 
performance, in particular on the beneficial impact of private and foreign ownership 
on firm performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Hence, we use ownership as 
another explanatory variable for efficiency. We have continuous data for proportion 
of a firm that is owned by the state, domestic private investors and foreign investors. 
However, with a few exceptions, the largest shareholder of each firm – whether the 
state, domestic private or foreign – owned close to 100 percent of the shares. Hence, 
instead of using the continuous variables, we use dummy variables to indicate the type 
of the controlling owner. Since fewer than 2 percent of domestic firms are state 
owned, it is meaningless to distinguish between state-owned and privately-owned 
firms.
3
                                                 
3  We nevertheless experimented with a dummy for state ownership in the specification for the 
inefficiency equation. However, the state ownership dummy was insignificant and was dropped form 
the specification. 
 We, therefore, control for foreign ownership alone. In our sample, 4.5 percent 
of the firms are foreign owned. 8 
 
  Labour market institutions: It is stylised in the literature that labour market 
rigidities adversely affect macroeconomic performance and intermediating factors 
such as the net entry rate of firms that is a key determinant of competition 
(Eichengreen and Iversen, 1999; Besley and Burgess, 2004). On the other hand, Storm 
and Naastepad (2007) demonstrate that the “rigid” labour market conditions promote 
long run labour productivity growth. This latter view is consistent with firm-level 
evidence that suggests that incentives like employee stock ownership and employment 
security can improve employee commitment, and are also positively correlated with 
performance enhancing strategies like greater investment in R&D and new technology 
(Kruse and Blasi, 1995; Michie and Sheehan, 1999). We choose a measure of labour 
market institutions that captures benefits to employees. We use a measure of the 
nature of the social security legislations in the countries in our sample, as reported in 
Botero et al. (2004). The index captures the extent of protection provided to 
employees against old age, death and disability, sickness and healthcare coverage, and 
unemployment benefits. The extent of protection increases with the value of the 
index. 
  Business environment: Finally, we include in the inefficiency specification 
measures of the quality of the business environment. In keeping with a large section 
of the literature, we use the indices of institutional quality provided by the Heritage 
Foundation (see Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan, 2004).The index ranges in value from 0 to 100, with institutional quality or 
quality of business environment increasing in the value of the index. As we shall see 
later, we experiment with three different measures of institutional quality or business 
environment: a narrow measure that accounts for the quality of property rights, an 9 
 
intermediate measure that accounts for business freedom, and a wide measure that 
accounts for overall economic freedom.
4
The firm-level data are obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
which collect data from manufacturing sector firms from around the world. The 
 
The inefficiency equation, therefore, is specified as follows: 
 
                        (4) 
To recapitulate, we are interested in the impact of institutions on firm efficiency, and 
hence the focus of our analysis is the sign and significance of the δ3 and δ4.  
For our empirical exercise, we use firm level data from nine developing 
countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Pakistan, South Africa and 
Zambia. They are not only very different from a macroeconomic perspective but also, 
as reported in Table 1, they also have quite different levels of institutional quality. For 
example, at one extreme we have a country like South Africa with an index of 
economic freedom that is 67.1, very close to the threshold of 70 for “mostly free” 
countries, and at the other end we have India with an index value of 51.2, just above 
the threshold of 50 below which lie the “repressed” countries. Similarly, the index for 
labour institutions indicate that we have, at the one extreme, countries like Zambia 
(0.32) which do not provide much protection to employees and, at the other extreme, 
countries like China (2.24) and Egypt (2.22) that provide a fair degree of protection. 
 
< INSERT Table 1 here> 
 
                                                 
4 Not surprisingly, all measures of business environment are highly correlated with the stylised measure 
of corruption, namely, the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International. 
Hence, the specification for the inefficiency equation does not include a proxy for corruption. 10 
 
surveys use standardised survey instruments, making data from different countries 
comparable. We  pool together cross-section data sets from countries that were 
surveyed between 2002 and 2005. Nominal variables used for the estimation of the 
production function were converted into real US dollars, thereby making them 
comparable across the countries. Some countries had to be dropped from the sample 
because of lack of data on all relevant institutional variables. After accounting for 
missing data, our sample includes a cross-section of 1625 firms.  
 
5. Regression results 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. The specification of the (translog) 
production function is the same across the columns, but there are differences in the 
specification for the inefficiency equation. In column (1), we report the specification 
with the broad measure of institutional quality, namely, index of economic freedom. 
In column (2), we report the specification with the intermediate measure of 
institutional quality, namely, index of business freedom. And in column (3), we report 
the specification with the narrow measure of business environment, namely, index of 
property rights. The statistical significance of the parameter γ indicates that there is 
indeed inefficiency in the production relationship such that ordinary least squares 
(OLS) would not have been the appropriate method to estimate the production 
function.
5
                                                 
5 If the null hypothesis of γ = 0 cannot be rejected, then σu = 0, and the inefficiency term u should then 
be removed from equation (3).  
  
 
<INSERT Figures 2 and 3 here> 
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Since the focus of our analysis is the impact of institutional quality on firm-
level inefficiency, we do not discuss the coefficient estimates of the production 
function itself, and proceed to a discussion of the estimates of firm-level inefficiency 
and its determinants. However, we report the distribution of technical efficiency 
across firms and across countries, in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Figure 2 shows 
that most of the firms are quite close to the frontier; a large majority of them has 
technical efficiency between 0.65 and 0.95. The average technical efficiency is 0.78 
and the median is 0.80. This can be expected in a competitive globalised industry 
where production efficiency might be the key to sustained export capabilities. Figure 
3 indicates that the average firm-level efficiency varies significantly across countries. 
In keeping with expectations, it is much higher in major exporters like China and 
India than in countries like Malawi and Zambia. These results are robust to the choice 
of the measure of business environment in the inefficiency equation. 
 
<INSERT Table 2 here> 
 
  The coefficient estimates of the inefficiency equation indicates the following: 
(a) inefficiency decreases with firm size , (b) foreign ownership increases firm level 
inefficiency, (c) labour market institutions that protect employees reduce inefficiency, 
and (d) an improvement in the overall institutional quality or business environment 
increases firm level inefficiency. The qualitative result about the impact of business 
environment on firm-level inefficiency is robust to the choice of the measure of 
business environment. It is easy to explain the estimated impact  of firm size on 
inefficiency: economies of scale matters. But the other three relationships are 
apparently counterintuitive and hence they merit some discussion.  12 
 
  The literature on the impact of ownership on firm performance posits that 
foreign ownership  is generally beneficial. Foreign ownership paves the way for 
greater access to better technology and export markets, and enables firms to move up 
the value chain. Note, however, that this view of the impact of foreign ownership 
generally examines the impact of ownership on profitability, whether current 
profitability as measured by (say) return to assets or expected long term profitability 
as measured by the Tobin’s q. In other cases, the impact of ownership on export 
intensity is examined. The efficiency with which firms convert inputs into output is 
generally not examined by this literature, and yet in this context the impact of foreign 
ownership could be very different. Management scholars have long emphasised the 
difficulty experienced by foreign owners  as they grapple with very different 
organisational cultures in overseas locations (Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 
2003). If cultural differences results in the failure of foreign managers to translate 
their global management practices into efficient production modes in a developing 
country context, production inefficiency relative to domestic firms who also compete 
in a highly globalised environment is entirely plausible. Given that profits are 
determined by factors such as mark ups which might favour foreign firms with greater 
(global) market power, this production inefficiency is not necessarily inconsistent 
with higher profitability. 
  Next, we discuss the positive impact of labour market institutions that protect 
the employees on firm-level efficiency.  As we have already seen, employee 
commitment might improve and firm behaviour become consistent with greater 
efficiency (and productivity) if employees are provided incentives in the form of 
profit sharing and employment security. While this line of argument appears 
inconsistent with the evidence about the adverse impact of restrictive labour market 13 
 
institutions on unemployment rates, firm entry rates etc, this apparent incongruence is 
easily explained. Consider an entrepreneur working in an environment that mandates 
significant social security benefits and employment rights to employees. These labour 
market institutions might deter the entrepreneur from starting new firms, but should 
she enter the market nevertheless, an action that would be rational only if it is 
optimum given the various constraints imposed by labour market institutions, among 
other things, it is entirely conceivable that the incentives provided to employees in the 
form of greater social security benefits would be beneficial for the productive 




  Finally, we discuss the negative impact of the business environment on firm-
level efficiency. Our result is stronger than that of Commander and Svejnar (2007) 
who find that cross-country differences in the measure of business environment do not 
have significant impact on firm performance, in the transition country context. 
Interestingly, in our results, the extent of the impact of business environment on firm-
level efficiency increases with the broadness of the measure; it is small (0.01) and 
weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) for the index of property rights, and large 
(0.30) and strongly significant (at the 1 percent level) for the index of economic 
freedom. In other words, while things like property rights have a very limited impact 
on production inefficiency – as one would expect – greater economic freedom that 
both raises prospects of future growth and provide greater access to factor inputs 
might result in greater accumulation of factor inputs, especially capital, relative to 
output. The negative impact of business environment on production efficiency, 
therefore, is quite plausible. 
                                                 
6 Institutions that emphasise employment protection might, of course, aggravate moral hazard problems  
as well, but the net effect could still be positive for firm performance.  14 
 
5. Conclusion 
It is generally argued that institutional quality is a key factor determining economic 
growth, as well as covariates of growth like market entry by firms and employment 
generation. Institutional quality is also believed to add to firm performance, when 
measured in terms of sales growth, investment growth and profitability. However, 
some recent studies suggest that, while better institutional quality may have beneficial 
macro implications, it may not have positive implications for firm performance.  
We use cross-country firm-level data from nine developing countries to 
examine this issue. We use production efficiency as our measure of firm performance 
because in a developing country context efficient use of limited resources has greater 
developmental implications than sales growth or profitability. We find that certain 
restrictive institutions like greater protection of employee rights, which are believed to 
have negative implications for macro variables like employment growth, may actually 
enhance production efficiency. By contrast, better business environment may actually 
be detrimental for production efficiency. Our results suggest that the debate about the 
implications of institutions and the classification of institutions into “good” and “bad” 
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Brazil  63.4  70  50  1.65 
China  52.6  55  30  2.24 
Egypt  55.5  55  50  2.22 
India  51.2  55  50  1.20 
Indonesia  55.8  55  30  0.53 
Malawi  54.7  55  50  0 
Pakistan  55.8  55  30  1.39 
South Africa  67.1  70  50  1.69 
Zambia  59.6  55  50  0.32 
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Table 2: Impact of institutions on efficiency 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Production function (frontier) 
Constant    1.32 *** 
  (0.12) 
  1.35 *** 
  (0.13) 
  1.38 *** 
  (0.12) 
Ln material    0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.28 *** 
  (0.03) 
Ln material sq.    0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
  0.07 *** 
  (0.004) 
Ln labour    0.49 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.48 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.45 *** 
  (0.04) 
Ln labour sq.    0.06 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.06 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.05 *** 
  (0.003) 
Ln capital    0.15 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.16 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.15 *** 
  (0.03) 
Ln capital sq.  - 0.004 
  (0.003) 
- 0.003 
  (0.004) 
- 0.002 
  (0.003) 
Ln material × Ln labour  - 0.14 *** 
  (0.008) 
- 0.13 *** 
  (0.008) 
- 0.13 *** 
  (0.008) 
Ln material × Ln capital    0.006 
  (0.007) 
  0.0007 
  (0.007) 
- 0.002 
  (0.007) 
Ln labour × Ln capital    0.02 *** 
  (0.009) 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.009) 
  0.03 *** 
  (0.009) 
Inefficiency equation 
Constant  - 14.13 *** 
  (1.11) 
- 7.20 *** 
  (1.22) 
- 0.68 
  (0.45) 
Size  - 0.13 *** 
  (0.05) 
- 0.16 *** 
  (0.06) 
- 0.08 
  (0.06) 
Foreign stake    0.008 *** 
  (0.002) 
  0.008 *** 
  (0.002) 
  0.009 *** 
  (0.002) 
Social security legislation  - 3.76 *** 
  (0.13) 
- 4.35 *** 
  (0.40) 
- 4.79 *** 
  (0.67) 
Index of economic freedom    0.27 *** 
  (0.01) 
    
Index of business freedom      0.15 *** 
  (0.02) 
 
Index of property rights      0.01  * 
  (0.008) 
       





  169.30 
  (0.00) 
  164.57 
  (0.00) 
  173.92 
  (0.00) 
γ    0.77 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.79 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.85 *** 
  (0.01) 
No. of obs.    1625    1625    1625 
Note:  The values within parentheses are standard errors. 
    ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
  
 